April 15, 2026

Whistleblower Protection in the European Union: A Legal Imperative for Effective Anti-Corruption Policy

by Maria Pavlova, TI-Bulgaria The protection of whistleblowers in the European Union has evolved into a central element of the legal framework aimed at safeguarding the […]

by Maria Pavlova, TI-Bulgaria

The protection of whistleblowers in the European Union has evolved into a central element of the legal framework aimed at safeguarding the public interest and strengthening the rule of law. Individuals who report breaches such as corruption, fraud, or abuse of power contribute directly to the enforcement of legal norms by exposing violations that might otherwise remain undetected. Consequently, their protection is not merely a policy choice but a legal necessity for the effective functioning of anti-corruption mechanisms.

This recognition underpins the adoption of Directive (EU) 2019/1937 on the protection of persons who report breaches of Union law. The Directive establishes minimum standards across Member States, including obligations to create secure reporting channels, ensure confidentiality, and provide protection against retaliation. Its objective is to facilitate the reporting of unlawful conduct and thereby enhance compliance with EU law.

However, developments since the Directive’s entry into force indicate that the existence of a legal framework alone does not guarantee effective enforcement.

Corruption Perceptions Index as an Indicator of Legal Effectiveness

The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), developed by Transparency International, serves as a widely recognized benchmark for assessing perceived levels of public sector corruption. While not a direct measure of legal compliance, it provides an important indicator of the effectiveness of anti-corruption frameworks in practice.

Between 2019 and 2025, CPI data reveals a pattern of general stagnation across the European Union, suggesting limited progress in reducing corruption despite the introduction of new legal instruments, including Directive (EU) 2019/1937.

The Liberties Rule of Law Report 2025 identifies several shared problems across Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Greece, Romania, and Spain that affect anti-corruption efforts and whistleblower protection.

First, many of these countries show stagnation in reforms, meaning that legal changes are adopted but do not lead to real improvements in practice.

Anti-corruption enforcement remains weak. Investigations are often slow, sanctions are inconsistent, and oversight bodies may lack independence or sufficient resources.

There are ongoing concerns about judicial independence, including political pressure and structural weaknesses that undermine trust in the justice system.

Another key issue is the limited implementation of EU recommendations, with many reforms being delayed, repeated, or only partially carried out.

 

Finally, a gap between law and practice persists. While legal frameworks including whistleblower protections exist, they are often not fully effective in reality. This is reinforced by low public trust and environments that may discourage reporting wrongdoing.

These challenges highlight an issue without effective enforcement and strong institutions, legal protections alone are not enough to reduce corruption or ensure that whistleblowers are truly protected.

From a legal perspective, this raises concerns regarding the practical effectiveness (effet utile) of the Directive and the extent to which its objectives are being realized at the national level.

Comparative Overview of CPI Developments (2019–2025)

An examination of CPI scores in the Member States participating in the Voice Guard Project Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Romania, Greece, Spain, and Luxembourg illustrates divergent outcomes in the implementation of anti-corruption measures.

The CPI ranks 182 countries and territories worldwide by their perceived levels of public sector corruption. The results are given on a scale of 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).

Member States Demonstrating Relative Progress

Greece

2019: 48| 2020: 50 | 2021: 49 | 2022: 52 | 2023: 49 | 2024–2025: 49

Czech Republic

2019: 56 | 2020: 54 | 2021: 54 | 2022: 56 | 2023: 57 | 2024–2025: 56 –57

These trends suggest a degree of alignment between legislative reforms and their practical application, although the improvements remain limited.

Member States Exhibiting Stagnation

Romania

2019: 44 | 2020: 44 | 2021: 45 | 2022: 46 | 2023: 46 | 2024: 46 | 2025: 45

Spain

2019: 62 | 2020: 62 | 2021: 61 | 2022: 60 | 2023: 60 | 2024–2025: 60

The absence of significant progress in these jurisdictions raises questions regarding the effectiveness of transposition and enforcement of the Directive, as well as the broader integrity of national anti-corruption systems.

Bulgaria – Member State exhibiting stagnation and decline

2019: 43 | 2020: 44 | 2021: 42 | 2022: 43 | 2023: 45 | 2024: 43 | 2025: 40

 

 

A High-Performing Jurisdiction

Luxembourg

2019: 80 | 2020: 80 | 2021: 81 | 2022: 77 | 2023: 78 | 2024–2025: ~78–80

While Luxembourg maintains a high CPI ranking, the lack of further improvement reflects the broader EU-wide trend of limited advancement.

Legal Challenges in the Implementation of Directive (EU) 2019/1937

Despite the binding nature of the Directive, its implementation across Member States has revealed several structural and legal deficiencies:

  1. Delayed and Incomplete Transposition

A few Member States failed to transpose the Directive within the prescribed deadline, raising concerns regarding compliance with EU obligations under Article 288 TFEU.

  1. Deficiencies in Enforcement Mechanisms

In several jurisdictions, protective measures exist formally but lack effective enforcement. This undermines the Directive’s objective of ensuring real and effective protection against retaliation.

  1. Institutional Limitations

Competent authorities responsible for receiving and investigating reports often lack sufficient independence, expertise, or resources, affecting their ability to ensure proper follow-up.

  1. Legal Uncertainty and Fragmentation

Divergences in national transposition measures have led to inconsistencies in the scope and level of protection, potentially undermining the harmonization objective of the Directive.

  1. Chilling Effect on Reporting

Persistent risks of retaliation and insufficient trust in institutional safeguards contribute to a deterrent effect, limiting the practical use of reporting mechanisms.

The Legal Nexus Between Whistleblower Protection and Anti-Corruption Effectiveness

From a legal standpoint, whistleblower protection functions as an enforcement mechanism that complements traditional regulatory and supervisory systems. By enabling individuals to report breaches, it facilitates the detection and sanctioning of unlawful conduct.

Where such protection is ineffective, the enforcement chain is disrupted:

  • breaches remain unreported,
  • authorities are unable to act, and
  • legal norms are not effectively upheld.

The stagnation observed in CPI scores across the EU can therefore be interpreted as an indicator of deficiencies in this enforcement chain.

Directive (EU) 2019/1937 represents a significant advancement in the EU’s legal framework for the protection of whistleblowers and the promotion of transparency. However, its effectiveness ultimately depends on proper transposition, consistent application, and robust enforcement at the national level.

The persistence of corruption-related challenges, as reflected in CPI data, demonstrates that the mere existence of legal norms is insufficient. Effective whistleblower protection is a necessary condition for ensuring compliance with anti-corruption laws and for safeguarding the public interest.

In this context, strengthening the implementation and enforcement of whistleblower protection measures is not only a matter of legal compliance but a prerequisite for the credibility and effectiveness of the European Union’s broader anti-corruption strategy.

 

References

Civil Liberties Union for Europe (2025), Liberties Rule of Law Report 2025

Transparency International (2019–2025), Corruption Perceptions Index